Andresito, me imagino que para una comunidad tan chica, el hecho debe
haber sido muy duro y fuerte. Siempre detrás de este tipo de sucesos
quedan abiertos muchos interrogantes... y ahí es donde entra en juego
la imaginación de cada uno. Yo también leo las informaciones a diario
y a veces con lo de un solo dia podría escribir libros mas gordos que
la colección de Harry Poter...

Mirá este artículo aquí abajo y decíme si...1) no es para escribir
una novela sobre las valijas perdidas 2) no da un poquito de chucho
pensar que esas valijitas anden dando vueltas por ahi?

Ulay escribimos una novela interactiva a distancia? (En Clarin este
año han hecho la experiencia de que un escritor abría un relato y la
gente mandaba posibles desarrollos y él elegía y editaba los mas
interesantes y así se hizo una novela escrita por cientos de
participantes... interesante, no?)

Un abrazo,
CK
P.D.: A propo kehila de Panama... conciste a una pareja de
argentinos, ella se llamaba Yesica y el marido (no recuerdo su
nombre) trabajaba en el country (Las margaritas, o mañanitas...puede
ser?) Si la respuesta es positiva... sabés algo de ellos?
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Posted on 09/14/2001 2:45:50 PM PDT by rdavis84

Are Suitcase Nukes on the Loose?
The Story Behind the Controversy
By Scott Parrish and John Lepingwell
View the full text version.

General Aleksandr Lebed's recent allegation that some former Soviet
suitcase size nuclear weapons may be missing has generated a storm of
negative media commentary in Moscow and concern and unease in
Washington. Even though many contradictory reports have been
published, some patterns are discernable that provide important clues
to unraveling the story of the "suitcase nukes."

In a meeting with a US Congressional delegation in May 1997, and
again in an interview broadcast on 60 Minutes on 7 September 1997,
Lebed claimed that the Soviet Union created perhaps one hundred
atomic demolition munitions (ADMs), or atomic land mines. These low-
yield (circa 1 kiloton) devices were to be used by special forces for
wartime sabotage and thus were small, portable, and not equipped with
standard safety devices to prevent unauthorized detonation. According
to Lebed, some of the ADMs were deployed in the former Soviet
republics, and might not have been returned to Russia after the
Soviet Union's collapse. During his short tenure as Secretary of the
Russian Security Council, Lebed started an investigation into the
whereabouts of these weapons, but was fired by President Yeltsin
before the investigation was completed.

Lebed's statements are not the first indication that the Soviet Union
built ADMs, or that some might have gone astray. In January 1996, the
Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies received
information from a Russian presidential advisor that an unspecified
number of ADMs had been manufactured in the 1970s for the KGB.
Indeed, in the wake of Lebed's charges, former Russian presidential
advisor Aleksey Yablokov told a US Congressional subcommittee on 2
October 1997 that he was "absolutely sure" that ADMs had been built
in the 1970s for the KGB's special forces, and that these weapons
were not included in the Russian Ministry of Defense nuclear weapons
inventory nor covered by its accounting and control systems. Even
earlier, in the summer of 1995, the Russian press published several
articles claiming that Chechen separatists had either obtained, or
tried to obtain, small nuclear weapons. Lebed's claims are thus not
completely new, but they are noteworthy because he was in a position
to gain access to information on such weapons.

Official Russian reactions to Lebed's statements were negative and
derisory. Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin termed Lebed's
allegations "absolute absurdity," while a presidential spokesman
said "such superfantasies can only be the product of a diseased
imagination." But as the official denials continued, they became
increasingly self-contradictory and less credible. Some Russian
military and atomic energy officials denied that the Soviet Union had
ever created ADMs, and even stated that such weapons were either
technically impossible, or prohibitively expensive. Others admitted
that such weapons might have existed, but that they were all
accounted for and under strict control. All agreed, however, that
Lebed's claims were motivated by his desire to regain the political
limelight and prepare for a future presidential campaign.

The official denials may well have been orchestrated and coordinated
to impugn Lebed's reputation and reliability. If so, they were poorly
conceived and raised more questions than they answered. Seemingly
authoritative statements by Russian officials that portable ADMs are
technically infeasible are belied by the fact that the United States
built hundreds of them during the 1960s. The Soviet Union certainly
had the technical capability to create portable ADMs, and may well
have had military requirements to do so. Soviet strategy included
diversionary actions and special force operations behind enemy lines,
and ADMs might well have been stockpiled for use in a nuclear war.
Certainly, if the United States developed and deployed ADMs it would
be unusual for the Soviet Union not to follow suit. Thus, the claims
that the Soviet Union did not produce ADMs are not convincing.

The claim that all nuclear weapons are accounted for is perhaps more
credible, but is impossible to confirm. The misleading statements on
the technical feasibility of ADMs do not bolster confidence in the
claims that all Russian nuclear weapons are securely stored. However,
most reports of the loss or theft of nuclear weapons have turned out
to be based on weak evidence. The articles on nuclear theft that
appeared in the Russian press in mid-1995 were apparently partly
based on a report in the extreme right-wing Russian newspaper Zavtra
(which in turn evidently was inspired by an article in the Russian-
language edition of Soldier of Fortune, which claimed that suitcase
nukes were smuggled through Lithuania to Iraq and possibly other
countries). Zavtra's correspondent claimed to have met with a former
Chechen "agent" who participated in the diversion of two suitcase-
size nuclear weapons to Chechnya in 1992. To bolster its claim,
Zavtra published the technical details of the devices. However, the
technical details appear to be inaccurate, and weaken, rather than
strengthen, the report's credibility. After publishing the article,
the Zavtra correspondent was abducted, beaten, and threatened with
death if he pursued the story. But after reporting the abduction,
Zavtra retracted the original article, claiming that the meeting with
the agent, and the subsequent beating, had been perpetrated by
Chechen agents who hoped that rumors of nuclear weapons in Chechnya
would strengthen Chechnya's hand in negotiations with Moscow.
Nevertheless, the original article triggered a string of media
reports and speculation concerning nuclear weapons in Chechnya,
eventually prompting an explicit denial of the story by Chechen
military leader Shamil Basayev. Thus, while there have been a number
of reports of the smuggling of portable nuclear weapons, the most
publicized reports do not seem to be based on firm evidence, and have
been propounded by sources of dubious reliability.

Lebed's charges have therefore not been adequately dismissed by his
critics, nor fully substantiated by his supporters. The claims that
the Soviet Union never built ADMs ring hollow, but neither is there
any solid evidence indicating the loss or diversion of such weapons.
This does not mean that the threat of diversion does not exist,
though. The social, political, and economic stresses that wrack
Russia provide strong incentives for military "insiders" to steal
nuclear weapons. While organizing such a theft would be extremely
difficult, the consequences of a successful theft would be
disastrous. Increasing security at nuclear weapons facilities, and
especially at civilian nuclear facilities with weapons-grade fissile
material, must therefore be at the forefront of the US-Russian
security agenda. Increased work in this regard may help to ensure
that stories of weapons or fissile material diversion remain fiction,
and do not become fact.



----------------------------------------------------------------------
----------
Dr. Scott Parrish is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International
Studies.
Dr. John Lepingwell is Senior Scholar in Residence and Manager of the
NIS Nuclear Profiles Database, Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies.

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