To Fred or François or to whom it may concern,

Never mind your political opinions; to some they will appear as
repulsively deceitful, lovely utopian to others, simply a sort of a
prank to most. In any case, could you PLEASE enhance your English
writing skills before attempting to sketch a lengthy article as this
is? In its present state, style and syntax are virtually unnerving,
not to say outrageously hilarious. I am positive that for a few bucks
you will be doing your cause a lot of good and, more importantly,
avoid the burden of mockery.

Yours,

Hadrian



--- En incredulos@..., Actuwa ! <bol@...> escribió:
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> Venezuela: Crucial Test for Bolivarian Revolution
> by Fred Fuentes
>
> While on the surface it may appear to be a simple electoral battle,
> something much different is at stake on November 23.
>
> On that day, Venezuelans will go to the polls to elect 22 governors,
> 328 mayors, as well as 233 legislators to the state legislative
> councils and 13 councillors to district committees — including
> indigenous representation — making a total of 603 positions.
>
> Once again, the intricate process of the Bolivarian revolution will
> put in play its strengths and weaknesses in the form of an electoral
> contest.
>
> Deepening the revolution
>
> What is at stake is the dynamic of an economic, social and political
> revolution that, since 2006, has unequivocally declared its will to
> leave capitalism behind and build 21st century socialism.
>
> To continue down this path implies a very rapid and energetic
> deepening of measures to adapt the state apparatus to the necessities
> of radical transformation.
>
> Will the Venezuelan people express, with sufficient participation and
> a majority weight, their will to accelerate the revolution?
>
> There is no historic precedent of a struggle of this type ever being
> resolved through elections — much less in the era of corporate
> monopoly over information and the shameless manipulation of opinion by
> the media.
>
> But, as has been the case since the beginning, this process
> demonstrates features dictated less by Venezuelan particularities than
> by the never-before-seen historic context within which it is
> occurring.
>
> And the fact is that, in the middle of October, opinion polls done by
> opposition companies, as well as those sympathetic to the government,
> augur a new and clear electoral victory for the revolution.
>
> If this occurs, it will be a real feat of perseverance in defence of
> a strategic program.
>
> Since December 12, 1998 — when President Hugo Chavez was first
> elected — up until the referendum on reforming the constitution last
> December, Chavez won countless elections of all types, each time with
> more voter participation and by a greater margin.
>
> On December 2, the constitutional reform proposal that would have
> allowed Chavez to take indispensable steps towards deepening the
> program of changes in the direction of socialism, was put to the vote.
>
> The massive abstention by the revolution's support base produced
> something more grave than simply the first electoral defeat (by the
> tiniest of margins) for Chavez.
>
> It called into question the sustained viability of a genuine
> revolution via the ballot box and with universal participation with
> full democracy for all — including those staunch enemies that, backed
> by the US government, did not hold back from using Colombian
> paramilitaries to sow anxiety and spent millions of dollars to confuse
> the citizens.
>
> Balance sheet
>
> By mid-2008, the opposition had lost their post-December 2
> triumphalism.
>
> Immediately after their narrow victory, an avalanche of propaganda
> attempted to transform this event in order to destroy Chavez.
>
> The propagandists of the right explained that it was the beginning of
> the end of Chavez and announced the certainty of an overwhelming
> victory for their candidates in at least 12 of the 24 states in the
> November poll.
>
> This self-interested prophecy even penetrated into the ranks of
> "chavismo-lite" — provoking something close to a state of panic in
> certain sectors.
>
> But the counter-offensive immediately launched by Chavez began to
> bear fruit by April. Halfway through the year, the more sensible
> spokespeople of the opposition reduced their expectations for
> victories to half a dozen governorships.
>
> By October, that figure dropped by half.
>
> The shift was due to three principal factors: the surprisingly
> organic and massive rise of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela
> (PSUV) in the electoral campaign; the solutions to — or frontal and
> efficient attacks on — pressing problems that had contributed to the
> December 2 defeat (food shortages, crime); the decision by Chavez to
> take the campaign into his own hands and, with the PSUV in full
> stride, stage events across the country to personally and emphatically
> back his candidates.
>
> This reversed the climate that, for a moment, had become predominate
> in the ranks of the revolution — at the same time reviving differences
> within the opposition and disarming their campaign, reducing them to
> little more than a media spectacle.
>
> Such was the demoralisation by the middle of October that one polling
> company at their service, Hinterlace, with a tone of desperation,
> advised: "The implementation of the social missions, housing
> construction in the poorest zones in the country and the fomenting of
> cooperatives to promote endogenous development, are initiatives that
> generate a perception that the government is really doing something in
> favour of the most needy.
>
> "It seems recommendable to not attack these government policies, but
> instead formulate superior initiatives within the framework created by
> the missions and the social programs, without displacing them
> completely."
>
> How to formulate superior initiatives? This the polling company did
> not clarify, instead warning that "it can be perceived that the
> President has fomented a greater consciousness within the population
> around social and political issues. Determined action has to be
> followed and talked up by the candidates of the opposition."
>
> Such an indication is backed by the most eloquent data in the
> Hinterlace report: Chavez enjoys "levels of support that oscillates
> between 45% and 55% of the Venezuelan electorate".
>
> Other, more reliable, polls point out that since the middle of the
> year this level has oscillated between 60-70%.
>
> PCV-PPT
>
> The two parties that did not go over to the opposition but also did
> not integrate themselves into the PSUV — the Homeland For All party
> (PPT) and the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) — ended up breaking the
> alliance with the PSUV in six states, putting forward their own
> candidates against the PSUV.
>
> The rupture that this signifies will bring with it consequences.
>
> It is clear that both formations, often with valid arguments, do not
> understand the significance of this electoral confrontation, which is
> not over candidates but rather something qualitatively different: the
> possibility — or not — of taking a decisive step towards a rupture
> with the capitalist system through democratic elections.
>
> The PPT and PCV also do not seem to understand the magnitude of the
> world crisis, placing them on a divergent path from the socialist
> character of the transformation underway.
>
>
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